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I   Introduction 
This paper highlights the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis on Scottish small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  Covid-19 has created an enormous systemic economic 
shock, potentially surpassing the one created by the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007/08 
(Baker et al, 2020; Brown and Rocha, 2020).  Such is the uniqueness of the current crisis 
some label it a metaphorical “black swan event” for entrepreneurship, as it encompasses 
virtually every sector, every type of business and every country spanning the global economy 
(Kuckertz et al, 2020).  Indeed, empirical work from around the world shows that as many as 
half of all small firms have temporarily ceased trading since the lockdown and as many as 
60% of SMEs are at risk of running out of their cash reserves (Bartik et al, 2020; Cowling et 
al, 2020; Giupponi and Landais, 2020).   
Public policy attention in Scotland and elsewhere has inevitably, and quite understandably, 
centred on mitigating the immediate effects of the Covid-19 crisis on SMEs in terms of their 
ability to maintain staffing levels, avoid cash-flow problems and prevent widespread 
bankruptcies in the wake of the lockdown (OECD, 2020).  In this paper, we reflect on past 
crisis episodes to help map out the nature of the likely longer-term effects of the pandemic for 
Scottish SMEs to help appropriate policy responses to be properly constructed and specified.  
The paper also identifies the likely implications for innovative SMEs owing to their central role 
in driving longer-term productivity growth (Lee et al, 2015; Haldane, 2018).      
 
II   The impact of the crisis on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Comprehensive evidence suggests the firms likely to experience the greatest impact from 
shock events are SMEs (Doshi et al, 2018; Howell et al, 2020).  In March 2018 there were 
343,535 SMEs operating in Scotland, accounting for 99.3% of all private sector firms1.  
                                                          
1 https://www.gov.scot/publications/businesses-in-scotland-2018/ 
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Together they employ around 60% of the Scottish workforce.  In other words, SMEs dominate 
the Scottish business population, so how these firms survive, adjust and adapt to the Covid-
19 crisis will have an enormous bearing on future economic and societal welfare in Scotland 
for years to come.   
We now highlight the key transmission mechanisms through which the crisis will affect Scottish 
SMEs.  Extensive research shows that the SMEs are heavily impacted by exogenous shocks 
owing to their limited capabilities to mitigate these events and withstand the attendant financial 
instability and uncertainty, resulting in major falls in capital investment (Herbane, 2010; Doshi 
et al, 2018).  Previous unforeseen events such as the GFC and Brexit caused significant 
damage to SMEs.   
During  a crisis, SMEs also encounter liquidity problems, which occurs when the cash 
generating ability of the company fails to pay for their current obligations and liabilities.   
Liquidity problems often result in cost-minimisation strategies rather than new revenue 
activities.  Indeed, a lack of finance instils a “wait and see mentality” which then leads to a lack 
of adjustment in SMEs.  This then results in a large under-investment in growth-related 
activities such as innovation, capital investment and international activities (Brown et al, 
2019a).   
Internal sources of finance are crucial for start-ups and SMEs (Robb and Robinson, 2014).  
Our recent work shows that many UK SMEs have very limited spare financial resources and 
only modest precautionary savings (Cowling et al, 2020).  This means that many businesses 
will quite quickly run out of cash reserves thus endangering their continuation and the 
livelihoods of their dependents.  Our preliminary assessment of precautionary cash reserves 
in UK SMEs suggests that there are potentially 120,000 UK businesses (mostly micro firms 
with less than 10 employees) at immediate risk of a liquidity crisis if they cannot generate a 
revenue stream for a few months (Cowling et al, 2020).   
Furthermore, it is estimated approximately half a million UK SMEs are already under 
significant financial distress due to the crisis2.  This suggests around approximately 8,000-
10,000 Scottish SMEs may be at immediate threat of closure due to a lack of cash reserves, 
with a further 30-40,000 facing financial distress.  Faced with extreme liquidity issues some 
SMEs may seek recourse to non-traditional high cost sources of finance such as credit cards 
as they attempt to meet their financial commitments (Brown et al, 2019b).  However, this could 
hinder or jeopardise their longer-term sustainability if excessive costly lending is undertaken.   
                                                          
2 https://www.ft.com/content/f9537538-d7a0-44e3-8e86-5cb9a984aae4 
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Access to external sources of finance are also critical, especially for growth-oriented SMEs 
(Brown and Lee, 2019).  Research emphatically suggests access to bank finance becomes 
more problematic for SMEs during crisis episodes such as the GFC (Cowling et al, 2012; Lee 
et al, 2015; Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2020).  This can result from a combination of reduced supply 
of lending by banks and reduced demand from SMEs who face chronic uncertainty.  Indeed, 
levels of borrower discouragement can rise rapidly during a crisis episode which can further 
curtail planned capital expenditure (Cowling et al, 2016). For example, in Ireland (which went 
into lockdown slightly earlier than Scotland) credit enquiries for new SME loan applications 
declined by two-thirds between February and April 20203.  This will likely translate into reduced 
loan applications by SMes in the months to come. 
While the vast majority of SMEs use bank finance, innovative growth-oriented start-ups and 
SMEs often utilise equity finance such as venture capital and business angel finance (Brown 
and Lee, 2019).  Research also suggests that these sources of entrepreneurial finance fall 
dramatically during crisis and recessionary periods (Howell et al, 2020).  Indeed, Figure 1 
below shows that the Covid crisis has dramatically reduced these levels of finance in the UK 
by between 30-40% in quarter 1 of 2020 (Brown et al, 2020).  We can see from Figure 1 that 
this form of funding dropped dramatically following the GFC in 2008, suggesting this decrease 
is likely to be sustained throughout 2020 and perhaps into 2021 (see Brown et al, 2020). 
Figure 1:   Number of UK deals by funding stage (2007 - 2020 Q1) 
 
 
Source: Brown et al, 2020 
                                                          
3 https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=Google+Scholar&ie=&oe= 
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This work also shows the deals and firms most negatively affected are seed stage investments 
in the newest and most nascent start-ups (Brown et al, 2020).  In other words, the smallest 
most innovative and growth-oriented firms may be starved of cash by the crisis with powerful 
knock-effects on reduced innovation in the longer-term (Howell, et al, 2020).  This could mean 
that Scottish start-ups currently being created may be hindered by a lack of funding 
opportunities for years to come. 
 
III   The types of SMEs most vulnerable to the Covid-19 Crisis 
We now examine the types of SMEs most vulnerable to the exogenous shock caused by the 
current pandemic.  Inevitably, as with all recessionary periods there will be winners and losers 
from these unfolding events, irrespective of firm size, age, sector, ownership structure and 
geographic location.  However, there is a strong body of evidence that suggests certain types 
of SMEs are more at risk from crisis periods than others.  Identifying these firms is a crucial 
first step to enable appropriate policy measures be deployed to ameliorate these malign 
effects.   
While the crisis will undoubtedly result in business closures, it should also born in mind that 
business churn within the population of SMEs is an inevitable and positive aspect of the 
Schumpeterian resource re-allocation process which occurs within economies during 
recessions.  For example, as some conventional retailers/restaurants go bust due to lockdown 
measures resulting in job losses, others online retailers and food delivery companies will grow 
and thrive creating new employment opportunities elsewhere.  This process will likely remove 
a sizeable proportion of the long-tail of low productivity SMEs in the UK (Haldane, 2018).   
Without question the firms facing the most immediate threat from the lockdown are the 
smallest and least resilient micro-firms employing between 1-9 employees.  These are the 
firms with the weakest cash reserves and lowest capacity to access to external debt finance 
to ease their liquidity constraints.  Importantly, research also strongly suggests they often face 
crisis events by becoming discouraged from borrowing as they fear they will be rejected by 
banks (Cowling et al, 2012).   
Start-ups are also heavily impacted by crisis periods (see Kuckertz et al, 2020).  This important 
pipeline of the business stock often need external finance to get their business ventures off 
the ground.  For some conventional start-ups, many rely on their own sources of capital and 
savings to finance their ventures.  However, for more innovative and capital intensive start-
ups this self-funded route may not be feasible or indeed practicable.  It would appear highly 
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likely that start-ups will be credit rationed during the crisis owing to the likely contraction of 
both debt and equity finance noted above.   
A shortage of finance for new ventures is of crucial importance because research shows that 
start-ups born during recessions are not only start smaller, they stay smaller in subsequent 
years even when macro-economic conditions recover (Sedláček and Sterk, 2017).  This 
means that the future levels of innovation in the Scottish economy are also likely to be 
negatively impacted.  This is also likely to decrease entrepreneurial entry as studies have 
already noted.  Data on new business applications from the US from the last week of March 
show that applications were down 40% compared to the same week one year earlier, a 
contraction that is even sharper than that during the Great Recession4. 
Funding problems are especially acute for very small and innovative SMEs (Lee et al, 2015).  
Our research strongly shows that problems accessing bank finance are particularly acute for 
innovative SMEs who often have limited collateral, intangible IP and unstable cash flows which 
make banks unwilling to lend (Lee and Brown, 2017).  Innovative firms are also those most 
likely to self-ration finance for fear of rejection, thereby becoming so-called “discouraged 
borrowers” (Brown et al, 2018).  Given their importance to economic development, enabling 
access to finance for innovative firms is a crucial policy objective during recessionary periods 
to enable such firms to undertake these strategic investments.      
Geographic location also determines a firm’s ability to access finance.  In the UK it has been 
shown that SMEs located in rural and remote parts of the UK face greater challenges 
accessing bank finance (Lee and Brown, 2017).  This is due to fewer bank branches in these 
locations and low levels of competition between banks.  SMEs often prefer close relational 
engagement with banks but are often too small to be given access to account managers.  
Furthermore, following the GFC many banks have heavily reduced their customer-facing 
employees to reduce costs, further exacerbating the problems faced by rural SMEs.  
Therefore, rural and peripheral SMEs in Scotland could be especially hampered by the crisis, 
especially as many are highly dependent on the travel and tourism sector which has been 
massively impacted due to the lockdown and the stop to travel by tourists.  Remote and 
peripheral areas of Scotland with low levels of local demand could be very badly impacted.   
Turning to sectoral impacts,  it would appear that localised service-based firms are being most 
heavily impacted due to the lockdown of large swathes of the service sector such as retailers, 
hospitality (pubs and restaurants), tourist-related firms, taxi firms, personal services 
(hairdressers, nail-bars etc.) estate agents, sports clubs and so on.  This has resulted in a 
                                                          
4 https://voxeu.org/article/startup-employment-calculator-covid-19 
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quarter of UK businesses temporarily closing their business.  It is hoped the UK’s job retention 
scheme can alleviate the immediate problems of paying staff salaries.  However, some of 
these firms are unlikely to be able to continue trading without sustained levels of support over 
the short-to medium term given a reduced level of consumer demand caused by social 
distancing measures. 
These types of SMEs may also attempt various forms of financial bootstrapping to minimise 
expenditure to endure a fallow period, such as foregoing management salaries, using credit 
cards, coming to agreements with suppliers, renting rather than buying equipment and using 
personal savings to run a business.  However, while potentially crucial to maintain a firm’s 
existence during a crisis period, this form of financial bootstrapping can often result in firms 
becoming seriously under-capitalised and at risk of closure in the longer-term.  
It appears that some of the winners from the crisis could be in high-tech, digitally enabled 
sectors such as life sciences, medical equipment, online delivery-based firms, software firms 
and app-based firms.  Even during crisis periods, high growth firms will adjust and grow rapidly 
(Brown and Lee, 2019).  Some of these firms may be in receipt of venture capital or business 
angel finance and already have sufficient funding to ease liquidity constraints.  Others may 
have funding models which make them resilient to shocks such as computer games 
companies where they get up-front funding from customers to develop new games.  Other 
winners may just be good, well run SMEs with strong cash reserves and a good management 
team.  More prosaic SMEs can also potentially thrive if they adopt new business models and 
organisational reconfiguration.  For example, a traditional local restaurant may reconfigure 
and become a manufacturer providing ready meals to their local market.   
 
IV   The Focus for Policy Support  
From the preceding discussion we can see certain types of SMEs may be particularly 
vulnerable to the Covid-19 crisis with the potential for debilitating consequences in terms of 
their future viability and future growth potential.  We now set out the main firms to be targeted 
for policy support, the nature of that support and then highlight some specific 
recommendations for interventions to mitigate the impact of the Covid-19 crisis.   
We highlight above, it is the smallest SMEs, micro-firms and start-ups that are likely to be the 
most heavily impacted.  These very small firms also have the least resources and levels of 
entrepreneurial resilience to absorb the shock.  Innovative firms are also susceptible to these 
problems owing to their difficulties obtaining finance.  Similarly, rural and peripherally located 
SMEs also face additional challenges.   
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The sectoral effects are harder to precisely discern but it appears that locally-focused non-
tradeable service-sector SMEs are also particularly susceptible to being impacted by the 
upheaval from the lockdown and the problems associated with social distancing.  Sectors like 
tourism (and hospitality more generally) will be particularly impacted given the lockdown 
commenced at the beginning of the tourist season and will effectively wipe out the summer 
season as well.  In a nutshell, these types of firms may need to be considered when 
constructing policy support interventions with additional targeted support measures. 
In terms of the nature of policy support there seems to be two key dimensions how policy 
should operate.  In the short-term, there is a need for a very rapid responses to ensure SMEs 
can continue operating, to ease liquidity constraints and ensure continuity of employment 
(OECD, 2020). This has been the main focus of the main UK government policy measures 
enacted to date such as the furlough sick pay scheme and the Covid-19 Business Interruption 
Loans scheme.  In the longer-term, policy support is going to have to focus on a different set 
of more growth-enhancing measures rather than business survival objectives.  Going forward, 
assisting start-ups, increasing innovation, fostering high growth firms and aiding business 
internationalisation will be core objectives to help build the recovery process.  The types of 
support instruments emerging in this respect are the UK’s Future Fund.  In recognition of the 
potential impact of the Covid-19 crisis for start-ups, the government’s Future Fund has a 
(modest) budget of £250m and provides matched funding of between £250,000 to £5m for UK 
start-ups5. 
We wish to offer a series of key short-term policy recommendations for alleviating the 
deleterious impact of the crisis for Scottish SMEs based on the issues examined above.  Below 
are seven key policy recommendations: 
First, the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme is probably the single most successful policy 
instrument enacted by the UK government to mitigate the harmful effects of the crisis. If the 
scheme ends abruptly for Scottish SMEs in October 2020 as planned, it could lead to 
extensive business closures thereafter.  Consideration should be given to extending the 
scheme for SMEs in certain predominantly service-based sectors of the economy such as 
independent restaurants, pubs, personal service firms and tourism-related business until at 
least the end of the year.  Large companies should be excluded from the scheme from but 
SMEs in those sectors should be given extended access (perhaps at lower rates) to the 
scheme given the likely reduced levels of demand for these type of local services due to social 
                                                          
5 https://www.businessinsider.com/uk-250-million-future-fund-explained-2020-4?r=US&IR=T 
 
Economic Commentary, June 2020  
 
distancing measures.  Being a UK-wide scheme the Scottish Government would need to 
campaign for this step to be implemented. 
Second, during the post-crisis period, while many SMEs will shrink and cease trading many 
others will grow rapidly. To ensure that these high growth firms help absorb those made 
redundant, there needs to be a better connection between labour market policies and 
enterprise support policies. To this end, some economists have advocated hiring subsidies to 
help encourage increases in new employment hires during crisis periods. Cahuc et al. (2019) 
provide empirical support that a temporary non-anticipated hiring subsidy in France deployed 
during the GFC had substantial positive employment effects. This could take the form of a 
reduction (or cessation) of social security contributions paid by the employer in relation to their 
new hires for a period of time. It could be targeted at SMEs and offered to promote employment 
expansion in growing firms.  Additional incentives could be offered to SMEs hiring young 
unemployed people rather than people within the workforce to increase opportunities for newly 
redundant workers. 
Third, while the supply of finance is crucial so is the need for demand.  Plus, many SMEs 
simply do nothing as a consequence of extreme uncertainty. This means firms refrain from 
seeking external finance because they fear rejection, leading to firms becoming heavily under-
capitalised. Therefore, the Scottish government should undertake a major marketing 
campaign to highlight the range of different support instruments available to SMEs to 
encourage them to access funds and help alleviate the anticipated increases in discouraged 
borrowers during the post-crisis period.   
The new Scottish National Investment Bank will have a key role to play in this post-crisis 
environment in promoting new capital investment by SMEs.  In the short-term, there is 
probably a need for a targeted loan instrument operated by the new investment bank for 
growing firms in badly impacted sectors.  Some have also suggested the new bank could 
insert productivity clauses in the form of loan covenants into their loans to SMEs (Brown, 
2020).  This could include measures to stipulate training initiatives for young unskilled 
disadvantaged people most negatively impacted by the crisis6.      
Another approach would be to offer SMEs free financial advice on different funding sources 
and financial products which are often difficult to comprehend by time-constrained 
entrepreneurs.  This could be targeted towards innovative SMEs who are often entrenched 
discouraged borrowers and the main focus for the new investment bank (Scottish 
Government, 2019).  Access to information about external sources of finance for start-ups and 
                                                          
6 https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_740893/lang--en/index.htm 
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SMEs can be helpful for enabling entrepreneurs to access the right type of financing for their 
ventures (Wilson et al, 2015).   
Fourth, most of the support offered by the UK government and the British Business Bank has 
focused on access to finance for SMEs such as the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan 
Scheme7.  This has also been the most common approach across most advanced countries 
(OECD, 2020).  However, survey evidence strongly suggests that during crisis situations, 
SMEs are highly reluctant to take on additional debt for fear that they will default on loans.  
This policy focus on providing government backed loans is therefore often a flawed approach 
for SMEs.  Plus, very few micro-firms employing fewer than ten employees, have 
precautionary funds to help them adapt during a crisis situation (Cowling et al, 2020). This lack 
of funding to undertake adaptation during a crisis situation is crucial.   
To encourage entrepreneurial adaptation policy must focus on changing behaviours.  For 
example, a recent survey by the Federation of Small Business found that a fifth of Scottish 
small businesses had introduced new online offerings since the crisis8.  Therefore, the Scottish 
government should consider offering small grants to SMEs who wish to undertake these types 
of new revenue-generative activities similar to the Brexit grant provided by Scottish 
Enterprise9.  The scheme could offer fast turnaround small grants of less than £5,000 to SMEs 
who wish to undertake new innovative business practices such as business model adaptation 
or other forms of product or process innovation.   
Providing the right type of incentivesis crucial to help SMEs adjust to the new realities they 
confront to enable them to remain solvent during a prolonged recessionary period.  Often small 
amounts of grant funding can generate significant behavioural changes for small companies 
to aid their revenue generating capabilities.  Longer term, the government may need to 
increase tax deductions on capital investment to mitigate falls in capital investment caused by 
a reluctance to borrow during the crisis.   
Fifth, in terms of support for equity finance, the UK government has already implemented the 
aforementioned Future Fund.  It appears from the initial reactions of equity investors that the 
seed finance deals are likely to be those most affected which predominantly involve 
investments for start-ups.  Owing to the nature of these funding sources, social distancing 
could result in financial distancing as entrepreneurs and investors cannot meet up and interact 
(Brown et al, 2020; Howell et al, 2020). One novel approach would be for Scottish policy 
                                                          
7 https://www.british-business-bank.co.uk/ourpartners/coronavirus-business-interruption-loan-scheme-cbils-
2/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIifbRko2G6gIVme3tCh3VNwr_EAAYASAAEgK8-fD_BwE 
8 https://www.eveningexpress.co.uk/news/scotland/small-businesses-in-scotland-innovate-to-keep-going-
through-pandemic/ 
9 https://www.scottish-enterprise.com/support-for-businesses/prepare-for-brexit 
Economic Commentary, June 2020  
 
makers like the new Scottish National Investment Bank to facilitate online engagement 
between entrepreneurs and private equity investors (i.e. angels) through a secure online 
meeting place similar to private equity crowdfunding platforms.  This novel form of online 
brokerage could help alleviate the informational problems associated with financial distancing 
during a crisis such as the Covid-19 crisis. 
Sixth, the Scottish Government is a vast purchaser of goods and services across the Scottish 
economy.  Through expenditure on vital public sector services like schools, hospitals, prisons, 
local authorities and public sector infrastructure, the government has the ability to have a huge 
impact in terms of its procurement budget.  However, often it is larger firms who benefit the 
most from these public sector contracts owing to the fact smaller firms have less ability to 
compete on cost with big firms or access to the tendering process of these public sector 
bodies.  Take catering for example, all these bodies spend a vast sum on catering but most 
contracts are with large UK or multinational firms.   
Giving SMEs greater access to these public sector contracts could provide a vital lifeline for 
smaller food, drink and hospitality firms which are experiencing reduced demand due to the 
crisis.  Enabling SMEs to access new sources of demand could be a vital way of injecting 
liquidity into these firms.  The UK’s departure from the EU will give the UK public sector greater 
room for manoeuvre in terms of public sector tendering process.  Therefore, the Scottish 
Government should commission work to see how these tendering procedures could be better 
accessed (and signposted) for Scottish SMEs, perhaps giving incentives to local authorities to 
commit more expenditure to buying locally from SMEs. 
Finally, given the rapidly changing landscape facing Scottish policy makers, they will have to 
monitor their interventions using real-time data (RTD) sources rather than relying on official 
backward looking government data sources such as official surveys.  RTD sources are often 
unofficial data which provide up-to-date information on various phenomena like business loan 
enquiries.  Using RTD, countries can also help track the effectiveness of such policy 
interventions by monitoring future changes in the market for entrepreneurial finance following 
a crisis period (Brown and Rocha, 2020).  Therefore, it can enable real-time policy evaluation 
to ascertain how effectively entrepreneurial actors respond to policy measures implemented 
to address crisis situations such as that experienced by SMEs right now as a consequence of 
the current Covid-19 pandemic.    
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Conclusion 
This paper has highlighted the likely impact of the Covid-19 crisis for Scottish SMEs in terms 
of identifying the types of firms most at risk and the key transmission mechanisms through 
which these firms will be impacted.  The overarching aim of the paper is to inform Scottish 
policy makers how to help mitigate the likely negative effects of the crisis for many small firms.  
It does so by offering a list of detailed key policy recommendations to help inform the Scottish 
Government during this time of crisis.   
This kind of detailed analysis is crucially important as the current Advisory Group on Economic 
Recovery has largely (and surprisingly) neglected the crucial issues facing SMEs at the 
present time (Scottish Government, 2020).  This is probably of no great surprise given the lack 
of formal representation on the group from the small business community such as the 
Federation of Small Business.  Much like the similarly vague (so-called mission-led) plans for 
the new Scottish National Investment Bank (Brown, 2020), it offers abstract goals such as a 
green, inclusive and investment-led recovery.  It is also oddly devoid of academic evidence of 
how different types of firms respond to unforeseen shock situations.  Consequently, the report 
is woefully inadequate in articulating the main problems facing the economy or providing policy 
makers with a strategic road map of how to help the vast majority of the business sector 
recover from the crisis10.   
While offering some potentially useful recommendations to aid the recovery such as a 
proposed Scottish Jobs Guarantee Scheme to help younger workers in the labour market, the 
report offers a series of very odd policy suggestions such as the Scottish Government taking 
ownership stakes in failing firms.  Policy makers are frequently lambasted for poor decision 
making when trying to “pick winners” in terms of selecting the SMEs with strong growth 
potential for support.  Picking losers could be even more hazardous given the politicised nature 
of such decisions.  This type of policy intervention is likely to be fraught with huge levels of 
moral hazard and adverse selection.  Plus, given their strong desire for operational autonomy 
and control, most entrepreneurs would baulk at the prospect of such intervention.  Similarly, 
the recommendation banks should benignly develop new products to help incubate companies 
is another very unrealistic and somewhat far-fetched idea, especially given the manner in 
which banks responded to smaller firms during the GFC.    
Overwhelmingly, small firms are those most heavily and negatively impacted by the chronic 
uncertainty caused by crisis situations for the multiple reasons elaborated within this paper.  
Just as the Scottish Government has admirably assembled expert medical evidence to help 
                                                          
10 The so-called Higgins report mentions SMEs once (see Scottish Government, 2020, pg 39). 
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control the spread of the virus given the specific nature of the Scottish context, it is incumbent 
on them to respond quickly using the best available evidence to help avert the crisis wreaking 
further economic and societal devastation across the small business population in Scotland.  
The Scottish Government therefore needs to produce a sensible set of imaginative measures 
based on the latest evidence to quickly address and alleviate the profound problems 
confronting SMEs.  While SMEs are the firms most heavily impacted by this crisis, they will 
also be a crucial vehicle to enable a sustained economic recovery.  
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